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THERE’S A NEW SHERIFF IN TOWN: COMMISSIONER-ELECT
ADAM SILVER & THE PRESSING LEGAL CHALLENGES
FACING THE NBA THROUGH THE PRISM
OF CONTRACTION
ADAM G. YOFFIE*
“I have big shoes to fill.”1
– NBA Commissioner-Elect Adam Silver
I. INTRODUCTION
Following thirty years as the commissioner of the National Bas-
ketball Association (NBA), David Stern will retire on February 1,
2014.2  The longest-tenured commissioner in professional sports,
Stern has methodically prepared for the upcoming transition by en-
suring that Adam Silver, his Deputy Commissioner, will succeed
him.3  Following Stern’s October 2012 announcement, the NBA
Board of Governors (“Board”) unanimously agreed to begin negoti-
ating with Stern’s handpicked successor.4  By May 2013, Silver had
signed his contract and officially had become NBA Commissioner-
Elect.5  The fifth individual to hold the position, Silver faces a wide
* J.D., Yale Law School, 2011; B.A., Duke University, 2006.  The author would
like to thank Matthew Parlow, Adina Yoffie, Amy J. Yoffie, and Megan Shannon.
1. See Sun Xiaochen, New Commissioner, Same Love for China, CHINA DAILY (Mar.
28, 2013, 07:41), http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/sports/2013-03/28/content_
16351874.htm (quoting Commissioner-Elect Adam Silver speaking to reporters in
China).
2. Brian Windhorst, David Stern Has Date for Retirement, ESPN.COM (Oct. 25,
2012, 8:02 PM),  http://espn.go.com/nba/story/_/id/8550645/david-stern-retire-
nba-commissioner-2014.
3. See id. Perhaps as a sign of a generational change in professional sports,
longtime Major League Baseball Commissioner Bud Selig recently announced his
intention to retire in January 2015. See Tyler Kepner, Selig Says ‘14 Season Will Be
His Last, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2013, at B12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/09/27/sports/baseball/selig-to-formally-announce-he-will-retire-after-2014-
season.html?smid=Pl-share.
4. Zach Harper, Taylor: Adam Silver Has Signed NBA Commissioner Contract, CBS
SPORTS (May 3, 2013, 7:46 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/nba/blog/eye-on-bas-
ketball/22190286/taylor-adam-silver-has-signed-nba-commissioner-contract.  The
NBA Board of Governors is comprised of team owners and representatives and
serves as the management body overseeing the league’s operations. See Michael A.
McCann, The NBA and the Single Entity Defense: A Better Case?, 1 HARV. J. SPORTS &
ENT. L. 39, 49 (2010) [hereinafter Single Entity Defense].
5. See Harper, supra note 4. R
(59)
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60 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21: p. 59
array of obstacles, which sports and business journalists have exten-
sively chronicled during the past year.6
Therefore, it is no coincidence that, like Stern, Silver is an at-
torney who brings a breadth of legal expertise to the Commis-
sioner’s Office.7  Both joined the NBA from prominent New York
law firms and rose through the ranks by serving in a variety of posi-
tions before taking over the top job.8  At Stern’s invitation, Silver
joined the NBA in 1992.  Working alongside his mentor, the Com-
missioner-Elect has played a major role over the past two decades in
the expansion of the league’s international presence through the
creation of NBA China, and growth of the league’s digital footprint,
including the launch of NBA TV and the development of the
NBA.com network of websites.9  Silver is also responsible for the
NBA’s involvement in the growing summer league, which serves as
6. See, e.g., Andrew Greif, The 5 Biggest Issues Adam Silver Will Face as NBA Com-
missioner, DIME MAG. (Oct. 25, 2012, 4:45 PM), http://dimemag.com/2012/10/
the-five-biggest-issues-facing-adam-silver/ (listing challenges in following order: (5)
NBA’s place in Olympics; (4) uniform advertisements; (3) competitive balance; (2)
tanking; (1) lockout-aversion); Maxwell Ogden, 5 Ways Adam Silver Could Ruin
David Stern’s Imprint on the NBA, BLEACHER REP. (Oct. 27, 2012), http://bleacherre-
port.com/articles/1385493-5-ways-adam-silver-could-ruin-david-sterns-imprint-on-
the-nba (listing key issues in following order: (5) logos on uniforms; (4) con-
tracting franchises; (3) TV deals gone wrong; (2) U-23 basketball; (1) elimination
of NBA draft lottery); Tom Van Riper, The Next Commissioner: Adam Silver Strikes
NBA Gold, FORBES (Oct. 25, 2012, 5:10 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
tomvanriper/2012/10/25/the-next-commissioner-adam-silver-strikes-nba-gold/
(noting that Silver helped Stern manage league’s costs, but explaining that Silver’s
own tenure will be defined by his ability to increase profits).
7. See NBA Career Opportunities: Adam Silver Deputy Commissioner and Chief Oper-
ating Officer National Basketball Association, NBA.COM, http://www.nba.com/ca-
reers/executives/silver.html (last visited May 26, 2013) [hereinafter NBA Career
Opportunities] (describing Silver’s pre-NBA career as federal law clerk in Southern
District of New York and then as litigation associate focusing on media and anti-
trust cases).
8. See id. (discussing Adam Silver’s employment at prestigious law firm
Cravath, Swaine & Moore); see also Michael McCann, Proskauer Rose is the Most Pow-
erful Law Firm in Sports, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 7, 2013, 12:43 PM), http://
sportsillustrated.cnn.com/more/news/20130307/proskauer-rose/ (noting David
Stern’s prior employment with law firm Proskauer Rose).  For a more detailed dis-
cussion of David Stern’s transition to the NBA, see infra notes 32-44 and accompa-
nying text.
9. See NBA Career Opportunities, supra note 7 (noting that Silver joined NBA in R
1992 and has served as Special Assistant to Commissioner Stern; NBA Chief of
Staff; Senior VP and COO, NBA Entertainment; and President and COO, NBA
Entertainment); see also id. (describing NBA.com network as “consist[ing] of more
than 60 unique websites, including NBA.com, WNBA.com, NBADLeague.com,
team sites for three leagues, and 15 international sections of NBA.com” and noting
that Silver also oversees NBA’s game telecasts, which are carried in 215 countries
and territories in forty-seven languages).
2
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2014] THERE IS A NEW SHERIFF IN TOWN 61
a prime example of his savvy in identifying new business
opportunities.10
The increasing complexity of the professional sports industry
calls for a highly skilled attorney-commissioner capable of navigat-
ing the myriad legal challenges facing the league and its subsidiar-
ies.11  Seeking to address those challenges by identifying and
analyzing the most pressing legal issues facing Silver, this Article
proceeds in five parts: Part II provides a historical overview of the
NBA Commissioner’s office, including a brief discussion of the ma-
jor lawsuits the league faced during the tenure of Silver’s four pred-
ecessors.  Part III addresses contraction and the potential, multi-
front, legal battle it presents.  Part IV examines the Brooklyn Nets
franchise within the context of the financial hurdles ahead for the
league during the Silver era.  Part V concludes.
II. THE OFFICE OF THE NBA COMMISSIONER, PAST-PRESENT
The NBA is hardly the only sports league run by a commis-
sioner.  Commissioners now direct all four major sports leagues in
the United States, as well as all of college football’s powerhouse
conferences and up-and-coming leagues such as Major League Soc-
cer.12  The rise of the office of the commissioner in sports can be
10. See N.B.A. No Longer Sits Out the Summer, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2013, at SP2,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/sports/basketball/nba-no-
longer-sits-out-the-summer.html (noting that, at behest of Silver, NBA got directly
involved in summer league in 2007, paying organizers to run event and assisting
with promotion and organization, such that “[w]hat started as a six-team gathering
that was thrown together on the fly in 2004 has blossomed into a 22-team assembly
that includes a tournament, owners’ meetings and one of the few chances for
agents and representatives from all 30 teams to meet in one place to hash out
contracts, discuss trades and lay the groundwork for future deals”).
11. Although NHL Commissioner Gary Bettman, a former NBA general coun-
sel, is currently the only other lawyer at the helm of a major sports league, Paul
Tagliabue, Roger Goodell’s predecessor at the National Football League, and
Francis T. “Fay” Vincent, Jr., Selig’s predecessor at Major League Baseball, were
both highly regarded attorneys. See McCann, supra note 8 (noting that Bettman R
formerly worked as attorney at law firm of Proskauer Rose); see also Paul Tagliabue,
COVINGTON & BURLING, http://www.cov.com/ptagliabue/ (last visited May 26,
2013) (discussing Tagliabue’s skills, accomplishments and responsibilities as attor-
ney and former commissioner); History of the Game Doubleday to Present Day: Francis
T. Vincent, Jr., MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/history/mlb_history_people.
jsp?story=com_bio_8 (last visited May 26, 2013) (discussing Francis T. Vincent, Jr.’s
experiences in law and as former Commissioner of Major League Baseball).
12. The four major sports leagues in the United States are the National Bas-
ketball Association (NBA), National Football League (NFL), Major League Base-
ball (MLB), and National Hockey League (NHL). See Monte Burke, Average Player
Salaries in the Four Major American Sports Leagues, FORBES (Dec. 12, 2012, 3:29 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/monteburke/2012/12/07/average-player-salaries-
in-the-four-major-american-sports-leagues/.  College Football’s Bowl Champion-
ship Series had six major conferences (Big Ten, Pac-12, SEC, ACC, Big 12, and Big
3
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traced to the infamous Black Sox scandal, in which eight Chicago
White Sox baseball players were allegedly bribed to throw a game in
the 1919 World Series.13  Following the suspected “fix,” Major
League Baseball installed Federal Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis
as its first commissioner.14  Landis only accepted the position on
the condition that he be granted plenary authority over all aspects
of the league, thereby establishing the position of “omnipotent”
sports commissioner that continues to this day.15
The Basketball Association of America (“BAA”) selected Mau-
rice Podoloff, a Yale-educated lawyer, as its first league president in
1946.16  Podoloff, a Russian immigrant who stood five feet, two in-
ches tall, spearheaded the BAA’s merger with the National Basket-
ball League (“NBL”), which became the NBA before the start of the
1949-1950 season.17  Podoloff also instituted the 24-second shot
East), but the newly constituted College Football Playoff will no longer include the
Big East.  The conference commissioners were at the heart of the negotiations over
the future of college football’s postseason. See Chris Dufresne, Power Conference in
College Football Gain Even More Strength, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2013, available at http:/
/articles.latimes.com/2013/apr/25/sports/la-sp-0426-dufresne-bcs-20130426.  In
August 1999, after spending sixteen years with the National Football League, Don
Garber was named Commissioner of Major League Soccer. See MLS Executives, ML-
SSOCCER.COM, http://www.mlssoccer.com/executives/garber (last visited Oct. 17,
2013).
13. For the definitive account of the Black Sox scandal, see ELIOT ASINOF,
EIGHT MEN OUT: THE BLACK SOX AND THE 1919 WORLD SERIES (1979).
14. See Brent D. Showalter, Technical Foul: David Stern’s Excessive Use of Rule-
Making Authority, 18 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 205, 206 n.6 (2007) (citing The Commis-
sionership: A Historical Perspective, MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/history/
mlb_history_people.jsp?story=com (last visited May 27, 2013)).
15. MICHAEL J. COZZILLIO, MARK S. LEVINSTEIN, MICHAEL R. DIMINO, SR. &
GABRIEL A. FELDMAN, SPORTS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 57-58 (2d ed. 2007).  For a
more in-depth discussion of the evolution of the sports commissioner, see id. at 57-
110; see also Robert I. Lockwood, Article, The Best Interests of the League: Referee Betting
Scandal Brings Commissioner Authority and Collective Bargaining Back to the Frontcourt in
the NBA, 15 SPORTS LAW. J. 137, 140-47 (2008) (discussing “[d]evelopment of Com-
missioner Authority in Professional Sports”).
16. See Mike Monroe, The Commissioners, NBA.COM, http://www.nba.com/his-
tory/commissioners.html (last visited May 26, 2013).  At the time of his selection,
Podoloff simultaneously served as the president of the American Hockey League,
which he continued to run through the 1951-1952 season. See J. Gordon Hylton,
How the Morals Clause in Jack Molinas’ Contract Saved the National Basketball Association
in 1954, FORDHAM SPORTS LAW FORUM, at 7 (2013), available at http://fordham
sportslawforum.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/How-the-Morals-Clause-in-
Jack-Molinas-Contract-Saved-the-National-Basketball-Association-in-1954.pdf.
17. See Sam Goldaper, Maurice Podoloff Dead at 95, Was First N.B.A. President,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1985, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1985/11/26/
sports/maurice-podoloff-dead-at-95-was-first-nba-president.html.  In 1948, the
NBL’s four best teams – Minneapolis Lakers, Rochester Royals, Fort Wayne Zollner
Pistons, and Indianapolis Kautskys – joined the BAA.  In 1949, the remaining six
NBL franchises followed. See COZZILLIO, ET AL., supra note 15, at 301.  For a more
comprehensive examination of Podoloff’s role in the development of professional
4
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clock, which he credited with saving the league, and used the full
extent of his power to expel a player for gambling.18 Podoloff’s
reign also marked the beginning of antitrust litigation over the sale
of team franchises.19
Walter Kennedy succeeded Podoloff as NBA President in 1963.
The league changed his title to Commissioner in 1967 and exper-
ienced significant growth during the 1967-68 season.20  He had pre-
viously served as the league’s first publicity director.21  Kennedy
transformed the NBA from a regional league into a national one
that expanded from nine teams to eighteen under his direction.22
basketball, see CONNIE KIRCHBERG, HOOP LORE: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL BAS-
KETBALL ASSOCIATION (2007); LEONARD KOPPETT, 24 SECONDS TO SHOOT: AN INFOR-
MAL HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION (1968).
18. See Goldaper, supra note 17; Hylton, supra note 16 (discussing expulsion
of Jacob “Jack” Molinas, former first-round pick and NBA All-Star, for betting on
games).  Molinas sued the NBA, but the Federal District Court for the Southern
District of New York ruled in the league’s favor. See Molinas v. NBA, 190 F. Supp.
241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).  Molinas was not the only player who sued the league as a
result of its crackdown on gambling.  Cornelius “Connie” Hawkins, a former New
York City high school star, initiated an antitrust lawsuit against the league for ban-
ning him from competition based on his alleged involvement in a point shaving
conspiracy. See Hawkins v. NBA, 288 F. Supp. 614 (W.D. Pa. 1968).  The league
eventually settled with Hawkins out of court and then assigned his player rights to
the expansion Phoenix Suns.
19. In its attempt to purchase the defunct Baltimore Bullets and move them
to D.C., the Washington Professional Basketball Corporation sued the NBA for
interfering in the transaction. See Wash. Prof’l Basketball Corp. v. NBA, 131 F.
Supp. 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (denying plaintiff’s motion for temporary injunction on
grounds that allegations of antitrust violations could not be adjudicated upon affi-
davits); see also Wash. Prof’l Basketball Corp. v. NBA, 147 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y.
1956) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s action for damages).  As-
piring owners have repeatedly turned to the courts following unsuccessful attempts
to purchase NBA franchises. See, e.g., Levin v. NBA, 385 F. Supp. 149, 150, 152
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment due to plain-
tiffs’ failure to demonstrate that they were rejected by Board of Governors in their
attempt to purchase Boston Celtics due to “anti-competitive reason” and noting
that “the exclusion of the plaintiffs from membership in the league did not have
an anticompetitive effect nor an effect upon the public interest”); see also Fishman
v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1987) (involving litigation by competing
groups seeking to purchase Chicago Bulls); NBA v. Minn. Prof’l Basketball, Ltd.
P’ship, 56 F.3d 866, 871 (8th Cir. 1995) (affirming district court’s decision to en-
join sale of Timberwolves and relocation of Timberwolves to New Orleans, thereby
“preventing the parties’ dispute about ownership and relocation of the
Timberwolves from standing the NBA and its 1994-95 basketball schedule on its
head”).
20. See Lockwood, supra note 15, at 149.  During Podoloff’s first season as the
newly dubbed “Commissioner,” the Lakers opened the 17,000-seat L.A. Forum,
league-wide attendance exceeded 4.4 million, and television ratings continued to
rise. See BILL SIMMONS, THE BOOK OF BASKETBALL: THE NBA ACCORDING TO THE
SPORTS GUY 103 (2009).
21. See Monroe, supra note 16. R
22. See id.
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Kennedy’s tenure was marked by the formation of the National Bas-
ketball Players Association (“NBPA”), the league’s first players’
union, and the transfer from the owners to the commissioner of
wide-ranging authority to direct the league, rendering Kennedy the
most powerful administrator in professional sports.23  Yet the
league and its newly empowered commissioner still faced a wide
range of antitrust lawsuits, including Spencer Haywood’s successful
challenge to the league’s minimum age requirement.24
Larry O’Brien succeeded Kennedy in 1975.25  A former na-
tional chairman of the Democratic Party and Postmaster General of
the United States, O’Brien faced a multitude of legal hurdles from
the outset of his tenure, including suits over franchise relocation.26
Yet he worked with Congress to enable the top four teams in the
American Basketball Association (“ABA”)27 – Nets, Spurs, Pacers,
and Nuggets – to transition to the NBA, thereby removing the spec-
ter of costly antitrust litigation.28  O’Brien also resolved what was
23. See id.  With competition from the upstart American Basketball Associa-
tion (ABA), the NBPA negotiated the first collective bargaining agreement (CBA),
which increased salaries and improved working conditions. See Lockwood, supra
note 15, at 149. R
24. See Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971)
(holding that NBA’s four-year college rule in which players must be four years
beyond high school graduation to play in league violates Section 1 of Sherman Act,
thereby reaffirming that professional basketball is subject to federal antitrust regu-
lation).  The NBA also faced litigation over discussions surrounding a potential
merger between the ABA and NBA. See Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (denying ABA’s motion to dissolve more-than-four-year-old prelim-
inary injunction preventing merger of, or non-competition agreement between,
NBA and ABA).  For a further discussion of Robertson, see infra note 29. R
25. See Sam Goldaper, N.B.A. Picks O’Brien as New Commissioner, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 29, 1975, at 25.
26. See, e.g., HMC Mgmt. Corp. v. New Orleans Basketball Club, 375 So. 2d
700 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (affirming trial court’s denial of preliminary injunction
and annulment of temporary restraining order in suit against Utah Jazz following
its move from New Orleans).  The court held:
[I]t is sufficient to deny preliminary injunction where it is unlikely that
plaintiff may obtain the relief sought on the merits.  We note that to re-
quire the Jazz to play in the Superdome also requires us to order the NBA
member teams to schedule and play those games.  At this stage of the
proceedings, and considering the preparations necessarily involved in
such scheduling, we cannot conclude that plaintiffs’ injuries will prepon-
derantly outweigh the possible injuries to defendants.
Id. at 711.
27. See SIMMONS, supra note 20, at 111 n.48 (explaining how ABA cycled R
through six commissioners – George Mikan, Jack Dolph, Bob Carlson, Mike
Storen, Todd Munchak, and Dave DeBusschere – in nine years).
28. See generally Richard Sandomir, No Team, No Ticket Sales, but Plenty of Cash,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2012, at B9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/
07/sports/basketball/former-aba-owners-ozzie-and-daniel-silna-earn-millions-from-
nba.html.  Contrary to popular belief, the NBA and ABA did not actually “merge.”
6
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arguably the greatest legal challenge the league ever faced, an
NBPA-driven antitrust lawsuit attacking the reserve clause.29  In the
face of these challenges, with Executive Vice President David Stern
by his side, O’Brien negotiated a landmark collective bargaining
agreement (“CBA”) with the players in 1983 that averted a strike
and paved the way for unparalleled growth.30  The historic CBA cre-
ated the first salary cap in professional sports, guaranteed revenue
for the players, and instituted a substance abuse program.31
Stern then succeeded O’Brien when the latter retired in
1984.32  Stern had worked as the league’s outside counsel for more
than a decade before assuming the “in-house” position of General
Counsel in 1978.33  He served in that role for two years before his
promotion to Executive Vice President in 1980 and then Commis-
Rather, the ABA folded, and the collapsed league’s top four teams joined the NBA.
Although legally significant, the distinction is immaterial from a practical perspec-
tive. See COZILLIO, ET AL., supra note 15, at 302 (discussing folding of ABA within R
context of antitrust and professional basketball).
29. Oscar Robertson served as the president of the NBPA from 1965 until his
retirement in 1974.  He filed a class action lawsuit against the NBA that chal-
lenged, amongst other issues, the reserve clause restricting the movement and bar-
gaining power of players. See About the Big O, THE BIG O, http://www.thebigo.
com/AboutOscarRobertson/RuleMore.php (last visited Oct. 18, 2013).  In 1975, a
federal district court in the Southern District of New York “conclude[d] at least
tentatively since the record [was] not complete, that the reserve clause . . . [was]
not [a] mandatory subject[ ] of collective bargaining,” and that the perpetual re-
serve system was “analogous to price-fixing devices condemned as per se violative
of the Sherman Act,” since it “allow[ed] competing teams to eliminate competi-
tion in the hiring of players and invariably lower[ed] the cost of doing business.”
See Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867, 891, 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (footnote and
citations omitted).  Yet the court would not render any conclusions regarding the
reserve clause’s legality in advance of trial. See id. at 896.  In permitting plaintiffs to
proceed as a class, the court nonetheless paved the way for a settlement that elimi-
nated the controversial clause. See Robertson v. NBA, 72 F.R.D. 64, 69 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (“The settlement effectuates a radical modification of the disputed practices
in respect of the college draft and options for future services.  In addition, there
will be a phasing out of the reserve compensation rules, arbitration of disputes, a
covenant by the class not to sue, appointment of a Special Master to supervise and
enforce the settlement agreement, and retention of jurisdiction by the court to
assert final authority in the enforcement of the settlement terms.”) (footnote
omitted).
30. See Monroe, supra note 16. R
31. See Showalter, supra note 14, at 209 n.34 (citing Dan T. Rosenbaum & R
Andy Stein, Re-Negotiating the NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement (Sept. 24, 2003),
available at http://www.uncg.edu/bae/people/rosenbaum/NBA/cba1.pdf).
32. See Monroe, supra note 16. R
33. See id.  On January 14, 1964, two hours before the start of the All-Star
game and its broadcast on ABC, the players told Kennedy that they would not play
unless the owners agreed to a pension plan.  Kennedy saved the All-Star Game and
the television contract by agreeing to facilitate a pension deal with the owners. See
SIMMONS, supra note 20, at 97-98 (2010). R
7
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sioner in 1984.34  Under Stern, the league has grown to thirty teams
in the United States and Canada.  Stern’s NBA is also an interna-
tional powerhouse with offices located throughout the world.35
Stern ensured that the league was quick to embrace digital technol-
ogy through the development of NBA.com and NBA.com TV.36  He
also exercised his authority to oversee conduct both on and off the
court.37  As one legal scholar noted, the Stern-led NBA has engaged
in the systematic manipulation of fans and media to justify its
34. For a more complete discussion of Stern’s tenure as commissioner, see
Michael R. Wilson, Why So Stern?: The Growing Power of the NBA Commissioner, 7
DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 45 (2010) (“David Stern has enjoyed
expansive disciplinary authority that extends beyond the basketball court,
micromanaging virtually all player conduct so long as it is related to a player’s
employment with the NBA. . . .  Stern’s use of power is arguably unmatched by the
commissioners of any of the other three major sports leagues in the United
States.”).
35. See Monroe, supra note 16 (“As Commissioner, [Stern] has presided over R
the expansion of the league . . . and the globalization of the sport.  NBA players
compete in competitions worldwide, including the Olympic Games, under the ae-
gis of the International Basketball Federation (FIBA), and the NBA has offices in
Europe, Australia and Asia.”); see also Harvey Araton, Series Was an Exclamation Point
for James and for Stern, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2013, at D3, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2013/06/22/sports/basketball/a-maturing-james-is-only-getting-
started.html (noting that after 2013 NBA finals, Stern’s last playoffs, “the Spurs,
with their rich international blend of players over the last decade, have been a true
reflection of Stern’s greatest achievement, [the] open[ing] [of] a new global fron-
tier” for basketball).
36. See Monroe, supra note 16 (adding that “[u]nder Stern’s guidance the R
NBA has enjoyed its period of greatest growth and taken basketball to the fore-
front of the global sports scene”).  Although the NFL reigns as the nation’s most
popular sport, basketball is overtaking baseball. See Jonathan Mahler, Is the Game
Over?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2013, at SR1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/09/29/opinion/sunday/is-the-game-over.html (“In 2012, the N.B.A.’s regu-
lar reason ratings on ABC were nearly double those of Major League Baseball on
Fox.”).  Stern, however, has also faced his fair share of setbacks.  In one of the
more memorable lawsuits against the league, and one of the rare legal losses for
the Commissioner, a federal district court upheld the authority of a grievance arbi-
trator to rule on suspensions imposed on players for a brawl with fans. See Nat’l
Basketball Ass’n v. Nat’l Basketball Players Ass’n, No. 04 Civ. 9528 (GBD), 2005 WL
22869 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2005).  Following the altercation at a Pacers/Pistons game
in Detroit, in which players entered the stands and fought with fans, Stern handed
down stiff suspensions. See id. at *1.  Yet the grievance arbitrator found that the
behavior in question did not involve “conduct on the playing court,” and, there-
fore, Stern did not have sole discretion to punish the players. See id. at *4.
37. See Wilson, supra note 34, at 45 (asserting that “David Stern has enjoyed R
expansive disciplinary authority that extends beyond the basketball court,
micromanaging virtually all player conduct so long as it [ ] related to a player’s
employment with the NBA”).  Stern’s heavy-handed style also produced positive
outcomes, such as the league’s widespread support for Jason Collins following his
coming out as the first openly gay active athlete in one of the four major American
sports leagues. See Howard Beck, Approval, But No New Team, for Collins, N.Y. TIMES,
July 9, 2013, at B11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/09/sports/bas-
ketball/approval-but-no-new-team-yet-for-collins.html?smid=Pl-share (highlighting
fact that Collins’ former teams offered supportive statements and that “Commis-
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wholesale usurpation of player autonomy.38  Stern has imposed
strict dress codes39 and levied fines for post-game commentary by
players and coaches, even going so far as to impose a gag order in
advance of media day press conferences to steer the conversation
favorably towards the league.40  Stern’s tenure has also been
marked by repeated labor litigation that has led to owner-imposed
lockouts and shortened seasons in 1999 and 2011.  During the for-
mer, the teams only played fifty regular season games, as opposed
to the standard eighty-two.41  During the latter, the NBA players
decertified their union and eventually ended up agreeing to play a
shortened sixty-six-game season.42  Although the labor unrest did
not cause the loss of an entire season, the players made clear that
decertification and other, potentially less savory, tactics were at
their disposal.
With such recent labor strife in mind and less than three
months until Silver’s transition, the Commissioner-Elect would be
wise to consider how he will shape his legacy.43  Silver is highly un-
sioner David Stern, who has a long track record of progressive policies, welcomed the
moment”) (emphasis added).
38. See Michael A. McCann, The Reckless Pursuit of Dominion: A Situational Anal-
ysis of the NBA and Diminishing Player Autonomy, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 819, 821
(2006) (describing demand by Chicago Bulls that Eddie Curry undergo DNA test-
ing prior to re-signing with team and implementation of rookie wage scale as ex-
amples of NBA’s broader attempt to arrogate authority at players’ expense).
39. See id. at 827-31.  The controversial dress code raised allegations of racism
and exemplified Commissioner Stern’s power over the players. See Mike Wise,
Opinions on the NBA’s Dress Code Are Far From Uniform, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2005,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/
22/AR2005102201386_pf.html (quoting All-Star Allen Iverson accusing NBA of
“targeting [his] generation–the hip-hop generation”).
40. See Michael Lee, David Stern to Gilbert Arenas: Don’t Talk About Gun Incident,
WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2010, 11:47 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2010/09/22/AR2010092205677.html (describing Commissioner
Stern’s instruction to NBA All-Star Gilbert Arenas and Washington Wizards owner
Ted Leonsis not to discuss prior year’s dispute over guns, in which Arenas was
eventually suspended for fifty games and sentenced to stay in halfway house for
one month for bringing guns into the Wizard’s locker room).
41. See NBA Lockout Chronology, CNNSI.COM, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.
com/basketball/nba/news/1999/01/05/lockout_chronology (last visited Dec. 21,
2013).
42. See Nathaniel Grow, Decertifying Players Unions: Lessons from the NFL and
NBA Lockouts of 2011, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 473, 475 (2013); see also Steve
Aschburner, Sides Make Deal Official, Camps Begin Friday, NBA.COM, http://www.
nba.com/2011/news/features/steve_aschburner/12/08/labor-agreement/index.
html (last visited July 21, 2013).
43. Stern has not gone quietly, recently pushing through a change to the
NBA finals, moving from a 2-3-2 to a 2-2-1-1-1 format. See Brian Windhorst, Vote Is
Unanimous to Change Finals, ESPN.COM (Oct. 23, 2013, 5:39 PM), http://espn.go.
com/nba/story/_/id/9867672/nba-owners-unanimously-vote-change-finals-
format.
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likely to reverse the trend towards greater consolidation of power in
the Commissioner’s Office.44  Yet he will still need to find the right
balance between aggressive legal posturing and negotiated settle-
ment.  One need look no further than the controversial issue of
contraction to find an example of the potential legal challenges fac-
ing Silver on all fronts.  Contraction may be nothing more than an
unrealistic abstraction, more bargaining chip than reality.  And as
discussed below, it is unlikely to lead ultimately to legal defeats for
the league.  Yet the multi-front warfare it could spawn is emblem-
atic of the legal intricacies associated with running a modern-day
sports league and the challenges ahead for Silver in his new role as
Commissioner.
III. THE LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF FRANCHISE CONTRACTION
A. Intersection of Antitrust & Labor Law
Federal antitrust and labor law are in tension with one an-
other; the former encourages competition by prohibiting “re-
straint[s] of trade or commerce” while the latter encourages
collaboration that often leads to such restraints.45  As a result, Con-
gress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act46 and sections 6 and 20 of
the Clayton Act, which collectively constitute the “statutory labor
exemption” that removes unionized activity from antitrust claims
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.47  Unions, however, are only
one-half of the equation; they need to reach agreements with their
44. Although Silver is unlikely to cede any ground to the players, he has al-
ready made a point of seeking greater consensus from the owners than his prede-
cessor did when making major decisions, such as negotiating a new television
agreement. See Kurt Helin, New CBA, New Looming TV Deal Means No NBA Teams for
Sale, NBC SPORTS PROBASKETBALLTALK (Sept. 11, 2013, 1:11 PM), http://probas-
ketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2013/09/11/new-cba-new-looming-tv-deal-means-no-
nba-teams-for-sale/.
45. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). See generally Gabriel Feld-
man, Antitrust Versus Labor Law in Professional Sports: Balancing the Scales after Brady
v. NFL and Anthony v. NBA, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1221, 1223 (2012) [hereinafter
Balancing the Scales] (describing “inherent[ ] conflict” between antitrust law and
labor law in context of professional sports through examination of recent lockouts
and union dissolutions in the NFL and NBA); Gabriel Feldman, Brady v. NFL and
Anthony v. NBA: The Shifting Dynamics in Labor-Management Relations in Professional
Sports, 86 TUL. L. REV. 831, 848-54, 857 (2012) [hereinafter Shifting Dynamics] (not-
ing that eventual resolution of antitrust-labor conflict between owners instituting
lockouts and players decertifying their union “will play a critical role in shaping
the collective bargaining dynamics in professional sports”).
46. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (2013).
47. See Feldman, Balancing the Scales, supra note 45, at 1228 (noting that Su- R
preme Court has read Norris-LaGuardia Act and applicable provisions of Clayton
Act “to protect unilateral union conduct from antitrust challenge”) (footnote
omitted).
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employers.48  To provide a framework for such negotiations, the Su-
preme Court developed the non-statutory labor exemption, which
similarly removes collective bargaining from the purview of Section
1.49  Under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(d), an employer (here, the NBA Board of Governors) and
the employee-selected representative (here, the NBPA) are obli-
gated to bargain collectively.50  Since October 1967, the NBA and
the NBPA have agreed to fourteen successive CBAs.51  Yet the most
recent CBA was unique in its inclusion of a particular provision.
B. Contraction: Introduction
In one of his more memorable interviews following “the deci-
sion” to take his talents to South Beach, LeBron James spoke in
favor of contraction to compensate for what he perceived as the
48. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) governs labor-management re-
lations in the private sector, including the realm of professional sports.  The NLRA
encompasses the Wagner Act of 1935, the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, and the Lan-
drum-Griffin Act of 1959. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.  For a broader discussion of
labor law and sports, see COZZILLIO, ET AL., supra note 15, at 649-710.  For a discus- R
sion of the effects of collective bargaining on the NBA, see Alexander C. Krueger-
Wyman, Note, Collective Bargaining and the Best Interests of Basketball, 12 VA. SPORTS &
ENT. L.J. 171, 173-79 (2012) [hereinafter Best Interests].  The NBA’s recognition of
the union prevents individual players from negotiating with the league. See
N.L.R.B. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967).
49. See Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Work-
men v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689 (1965); United Mine Workers v. Pen-
ington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).  For example, the salary cap agreed to via collective
bargaining is not subject to Section 1 analysis. See Wood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n,
809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).  For a more comprehensive discussion of the evolu-
tion of the nonstatutory labor exemption, see Jonathan S. Shapiro, Note, Warming
the Bench: The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption in the National Football League, 61 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1203, 1207 (1993) (“The Supreme Court has recognized a nonstatu-
tory exemption to protect employers from liability for antitrust violations based on
‘a proper accommodation between the congressional policy favoring collective
bargaining under the NLRA and the congressional policy favoring free competi-
tion in business [as expressed in the Sherman Act].’”) (footnote omitted).
50. Each NBA team has a representative on the Board which makes decisions
regarding the league’s business and policies.  “Furthermore, with various powers
assented to by each NBA franchise, the NBA commissioner very much serves as a
centralizing force over NBA teams.”  McCann, Single Entity Defense, supra note 4, at R
49 (footnote omitted).  The NBPA aims to protect NBA players’ rights, ensuring
“every conceivable measure is taken to assist players in maximizing their opportu-
nities and achieving their goals, both on and off the court.” About the NBPA, NAT’L
BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASS’N, http://www.nbpa.org/about-nbpa (last visited Dec. 22,
2013).  For a discussion of the NBA’s relationship with the NBPA, see McCann,
Single Entity Defense, supra note 4, at 43-47 (noting that “[t]he relationship between R
the NBA and NBPA has seen its highs and lows” but emphasizing that
“[n]egotiation between the NBA and NBPA is crucial for the league’s success and
for the league’s capacity to avoid antitrust rebuke”).
51. See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 686 (2d Cir. 1995) (ac-
counting for all CBAs prior to 1995, 1999, 2005, and 2011 CBAs).
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dearth of talent necessary to support thirty teams.52  James bluntly
stated: “ ‘[Contraction] is not my job; I’m a player but that is why it,
the league, was so great [in the ‘80s]. . . . It wasn’t as watered down
as it is [now].’”53  James was not the only prominent NBA figure at
the time discussing the possibility of contraction.  During the 2011
lockout, Commissioner Stern publicly noted that players and own-
ers were both open to the possibility.54
The NBA is currently comprised of thirty teams.55  Throughout
its history, the NBA has followed a steady path of growth through
the assimilation of teams from competing leagues56 and has not
contracted since the 1954-55 season, when the first iteration of the
Baltimore Bullets franchise was eliminated.57  Yet, overall, ten teams
have ceased operations since the merger between the Basketball As-
sociation of America and National Basketball League.58  Unlike
52. See Henry Abbott, LeBron James’ Decision: The Transcript, ESPN.COM (July 8,
2010, 11:35 PM), http://espn.go.com/blog/truehoop/post/_/id/17853/lebron-
james-decision-the-transcript (announcing LeBron James’ decision to leave Cleve-
land Cavaliers for Miami Heat).  Speaking to reporters, LeBron James commented:
“‘Imagine if you could take Kevin Love off Minnesota and add him to another
team and you shrink the [league].  Looking at some of the teams that aren’t that
great, you take Brook Lopez or you take Devin Harris off these teams that aren’t
that good right now and you add him to a team that could be really good.’” Id.
[alteration in original].  James added: “ ‘[I’m] [n]ot saying let’s take New Jersey
and let’s take Minnesota out of the league.  But hey, you guys are not stupid, I’m
not stupid, it would be great for the league.’”  Brian Windhorst, LeBron James Dis-
cusses Contraction, ESPN.COM (Dec. 24, 2010, 8:14 PM) http://sports.espn.go.com/
nba/truehoop/miamiheat/news/story?id=5952952.
53. Windhorst, supra note 52.
54. See Cindy Borne, Commissioner David Stern Isn’t Ruling Out NBA Contraction,
WASH. POST (Aug. 15, 2011, 11:26 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
early-lead/post/commissioner-david-stern-isnt-ruling-out-nba-contraction/2011/
08/15/gIQAePs2GJ_blog.html (explaining on ESPN podcast that contraction was
not something owners were against).  Stern explained: “ ‘In fact, when you talk
about revenue sharing, a number of teams have said that if you have a team that is
perpetually going to be a recipient, aren’t you better off with the ability to buy
them in? . . . The players actually have been heard to suggest that as well . . . .’” Id.
55. See NBA, Teams, http://www.nba.com/teams/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2014).
56. Non-NBA professional basketball teams have folded.  Ten teams from the
BAA and NBL were eliminated upon their merger to form the NBA. See Scott
Rosner, Squeeze Play: Analyzing Contraction in Professional Sports, 10 VILL. SPORTS &
ENT. L.J. 29, 33-34 (2003) (citing JAMES QUIRK & RODNEY FORT, PAY DIRT 446-59
(2d ed. 1995)) [hereinafter Squeeze Play].  Only four of the ABA’s teams survived
after the league folded. See Sandomir, supra note 28 (listing New York Nets, San R
Antonio Spurs, Indiana Pacers, and Denver Nuggets as surviving teams).
57. See Rosner, Squeeze Play, supra note 56, at 34.  “The significance of contrac- R
tion is that it allows teams to make greater use of the league monopoly capital and
to increase political capital for the existing teams.” Id. (citing GERALD W. SCULLY,
THE MARKET STRUCTURE OF SPORTS 18 (1995)).
58. See Scott R. Rosner, The History and Business of Contraction in Major League
Baseball, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 265, 269-70 (2003) (listing first team to fold as
Providence Steamrollers in 1949, followed by Anderson Packers, Chicago Stags,
12
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol21/iss1/4
34639-vls_21-1 Sheet No. 44 Side A      03/14/2014   13:49:04
34639-vls_21-1 Sheet No. 44 Side A      03/14/2014   13:49:04
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\21-1\VLS104.txt unknown Seq: 13 11-MAR-14 10:46
2014] THERE IS A NEW SHERIFF IN TOWN 71
franchise relocation, in which a team moves to a different city and
often assumes a new name under the control of an alternative own-
ership group, contraction refers to the complete removal of a team
from the league.  Franchise relocation and the ensuing litigation
are a constant threat to league stability and a drain on league re-
sources.59  The recent battle between Sacramento and Seattle over
the future of the Kings is emblematic of the emotional and fiscal
toll associated with even the threat of such relocation.60  Relocated
franchises, nonetheless, at least offer the prospect of attracting fans
in a new geographic location.61  Contracted franchises, on the
other hand, cease to exist as a member of the league and bargain-
ing unit covered by the CBA.
The goal of contraction is to increase the bottom line for each
team by eliminating those that are unable to generate sufficient lo-
cal revenue to achieve competitive balance and financial stability.62
Contraction is not only relevant right now as a result of the “Great
Recession”63 but also due to the league’s over-expansion in the ‘80s
and ‘90s, in which the NBA added six teams within a span of seven
years.64  In spite of contraction’s fiscal relevance, no major sports
Denver Nuggets, St. Louis Bombers, Sheboygan Redskins, and Waterlook Hawks in
1950, as well as Washington Capitals in 1951, Indianapolis Olympians in 1954, and
Baltimore Bullets during 1954-1955 season) [hereinafter, History and Business].
Franchise scarcity permits “the clubs to exercise leverage over local governments
and taxpayers when seeking new stadia because they can use the threat of reloca-
tion.” Id. at 277.
59. See generally Brett Gibbs, Note, Antitrust and Sports League Franchise Reloca-
tion: Bringing Raiders I into the Modern Era of Antitrust Law, 29 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L. J. 217 (2007) (describing “significant economic impact” franchise reloca-
tion has on all parties involved, including cities and fans).
60. See Dale Kasler, Tony Bizjak & Ryan Lillis, Sacramento Mayor Kevin Johnson
Tells the Story of How the City Kept the Kings, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 15, 2013, available
at http://www.sacbee.com/2013/06/15/5498635/sacramento-mayor-kevin-john-
son.html (describing high-stakes battle between high-bidding Seattle ownership
group and hastily formed Sacramento investor team).
61. In 2008, the Seattle Supersonics became the fourth NBA franchise to relo-
cate since 1985 when its new ownership group moved the team to Oklahoma City
and changed the name to the Thunder. See Elizabeth Odian, Article, Preventing
Sonicsgate: The Ongoing Problem of Franchise Relocation, 18 SPORTS LAW. J. 67, 68
(2011) (footnote omitted).
62. See Rosner, Squeeze Play, supra note 56, at 37. R
63. For an in-depth discussion of the impact of the “Great Recession” on the
league, particularly within a labor context, see Matthew J. Parlow, The NBA and the
Great Recession: Implications for the Upcoming Collective Bargaining Agreement Renegoti-
ation, 6 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195 (2010) (describing economic
downturn’s impact on growing gap between “haves” and “have-nots”).
64. See Rosner, History and Business, supra note 58, at 277 (listing addition of R
franchises in Charlotte and Miami in 1988; Orlando and Minneapolis in 1989; and
Toronto and Vancouver in 1995).  Such overexpansion has made it increasingly
difficult for teams to find desirable relocation cities, as is evident from recent
13
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league in the modern era has actually contracted.65  Yet, in 2001,
MLB owners voted 28-2 to eliminate two teams prior to the 2002
season.66  Although the league did not end up following
through67–in no small part due to the subsequent litigation and
labor negotiations–the vote set a precedent within the four major
professional sports leagues.68  In the build-up to the 2011 lockout,
Commissioner Stern alleged that twenty-two of the thirty teams in
the NBA were losing money.69  Stern estimated the teams’ collective
losses at approximately $370 million per season.70  The NBPA coun-
tered that only a handful of teams were actually suffering finan-
cially, and that their monetary problems largely could be alleviated
through enhanced revenue sharing.71  Regardless of the veracity of
either side’s claims, the ensuing negotiations, lockout, union decer-
tification, and eventual agreement produced a CBA that for the
first time included a provision on contraction.72  As a result, Silver
moves to small-market Memphis (from Vancouver) and New Orleans (from Char-
lotte). See id.
65. For a history of contraction in major league baseball, see Rosner, History
and Business, id. at 267 (describing frequent contraction of teams that took place in
early era of professional baseball).
66. See id. at 265 (noting that, due to combined economic losses of $232.241
million in 2001, MLB owners voted 28-2 to eliminate or contract two teams prior to
2002 season) (footnote omitted).
67. The Montreal Expos moved to Washington, D.C., and became the Nation-
als before the 2005 season. See Franchise Timeline, WASHINGTON NATIONALS, http://
mlb.mlb.com/was/history/timeline.jsp (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).  Although it
took a few years, the Minnesota Twins eventually moved into a new stadium. See
Jim Caple, Inside New Target Field: Outdoor Baseball Returns to Minnesota for the First
Time in 29 Years.  Dress in Layers, ESPN.COM (Apr. 12, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.
com/mlb/columns/story?columnist=caple_jim&id=5073045.
68. Although not one of the four major sports leagues in North America, Ma-
jor League Soccer contracted two teams (Miami Fusion and Tampa Bay Mutiny) as
a result of economic problems. See Jack Bell, Major League Soccer Eliminates Two
Teams, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2002, at D6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/
01/09/sports/soccer-major-league-soccer-eliminates-two-teams.html.  Subse-
quently, the 2004-2010 MLS CBA addressed the possibility of contraction repeat-
edly. See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER &
MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER PLAYERS UNION (Dec. 1, 2004–Jan. 31, 2010), available at
http://www.ipmall.info/hosted_resources/SportsEntLaw_Institute/2004MLS_
MLSPA_CBA.pdf.
69. See Larry Coon, Is the NBA Really Losing Money?, ESPN.COM (July 12, 2011,
12:39 AM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/columns/story?columnist=coon_
larry&page=NBAFinancials-110630.
70. See id.
71. See id.  The NBPA claimed that the majority of league’s alleged losses
stemmed from the perfectly legal but somewhat disingenuous “amortization of in-
tangible assets” stemming from the annual deduction of a portion of the purchase
price of the team when calculating losses. See id.
72. See NBA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 463 (Dec. 2011), revised May
30, 2013, available at http://www.ipmall.info/hosted_resources/SportsEntLaw_In-
14
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will be the first non-lame-duck Commissioner to preside over the
league in which the governing agreement between the owners and
players explicitly addresses “contraction.”73
Under Article XL, Section 2, the CBA states:
If, during the term of this Agreement, the NBA decides to
contract the number of Teams, (a) the NBA shall provide
written notice of such decision to the Players Association,
and (b) the NBA and the Players Association shall negoti-
ate and agree upon the effects of such decision on the
players and the procedures to be followed in connection
therewith.74
The conventional thinking may be that contraction is not a serious
possibility, and that the recent above-market bids for the Kings indi-
cate that expansion into Seattle is more likely than contraction.75
The CBA provision, however, speaks for itself, especially within the
context of the outstanding regulatory obstacles in Seattle76 and dis-
stitute/UNHSportsEntLaw_Institute.asp [hereinafter CBA 2011].  The league’s By-
Laws and Constitution are not available to the public.
73. Expansion, on the other hand, has been included as an explicit provision
of the past four CBAs: 2011 (Art. XL); 2005 (Art. XL); 1999 (Art. XL); 1995 (Art.
XXXIX).  The 1995-96 season was the last time the league actually expanded,
through the addition of the Toronto Raptors and Vancouver Grizzlies (since
moved to Memphis), two new franchises that were not compensating for the relo-
cation of a prior franchise in the city (as was the case with the more recent addi-
tion of the Charlotte Bobcats following the Charlotte Hornets move to New
Orleans). See Bob Condotta, Is Expansion Really an Option for NBA, Sonics Group?,
SEATTLE TIMES (May 4, 2013, 9:24 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/nba/2020
924314_expansion05.html.
74. CBA 2011 (Art. XL, Sec. 2).
75. See Nick Eaton, Report: NBA, Chris Hansen in ‘Productive’ Talks for Seattle
Expansion Team, SEATTLE PI (June 12, 2013, 1:38 PM), http://blog.seattlepi.com/
sonics/2013/06/12/report-nba-chris-hansen-in-productive-talks-for-seattle-expan-
sion-team/. But see Kurt Badenhausen, Will Expansion Solve Sacramento and Seattle
Fight over Kings?, FORBES (Apr. 29, 2013, 6:36 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
kurtbadenhausen/2013/04/29/will-expansion-solve-sacramento-and-seattle-fight-
over-kings/ (quoting Stern as saying, “I haven’t heard [expansion talk] in any
shape or form, particularly when we don’t know at this time what the next televi-
sion network contract would be”).  The NBA would also be pressured to open the
expansion process to competitive bidding, in which other cities could vie with Seat-
tle for a professional basketball team. See Condotta, supra note 73 (quoting sports R
law scholar Michael McCann as citing league’s historical precedent for expansion
and desire to avoid legal challenges as favoring open bidding system that would
likely include Seattle, Vancouver, Kansas City, St. Louis, Pittsburgh, and Las
Vegas).
76. The agreement to build a new stadium in Seattle, seen as necessary for a
future NBA team, requires a full review under the State Environmental Policy Act.
See Lynn Thompson, Seattle Center in Arena Review–But Sodo Still Gets the Arena, SEAT-
TLE TIMES (Oct. 26, 2012, 9:43 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/20
19535100_arenaimpacts27m.html.  For a comprehensive discussion of the role of
15
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mal on-court performance of the most recent expansion team, the
Charlotte Bobcats.77  A step as bold as contraction would also firmly
announce Silver’s arrival as Commissioner and endear him to own-
ers eager to see if he can match the unrivaled economic growth
enjoyed under his predecessor.78  Based on the league’s structure
for revenue sharing, contraction–in conjunction with a new, re-
cord-breaking television contract following the 2015-2016 sea-
son79–could go a long way toward improving the owners’ bottom
lines.80
such environmental studies, see Alex Porteshawver, Symposium, Under Review: Sta-
dium Construction and State Environmental Policy Acts, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 339
(2010) (analyzing application of state environmental laws to sports stadium
development).
77. See Jordan’s Bobcats Clinch Worst Record, FOX SPORTS (Apr. 27, 2012, 12:59
AM), http://msn.foxsports.com/nba/story/Charlotte-Bobcats-of-Michael-Jordan-
clinch-worst-record-ever-042612 (noting that 2012 Bobcats finished with worst win-
ning percentage, .106, in NBA history).  In the last four seasons, the team’s record
is 106-206, and the franchise has only had a winning record one season since it
joined the league.  The team is changing its name back to the Hornets, who made
the playoffs seven times during its fourteen-year tenure in the city before moving
to New Orleans. See Ben Golliver, Michael Jordan Announces Charlotte Bobcats to
Change Name to ‘Hornets’ in 2014, SI.COM (May 21, 2013), http://nba.si.com/2013/
05/21/michael-jordan-charlotte-bobcats-hornets-name-change/.
78. The NBA would likely have to buy the contracted team at an above-market
price in order to wind down its operations. See Rosner, History and Business, supra
note 58, at 280.  The recent rise in franchise prices may render such a move less R
likely. See Helin, supra note 44.  But the league would also gain the former city as a R
bargaining chip for future teams in need of new stadiums and considering reloca-
tion. See Rosner, History and Business, supra note 58, at 280. The NBA, moreover, R
has experience purchasing financially distressed teams, as it did in New Orleans.
See Krueger-Wyman, Best Interests, supra note 48, at 171-72. R
79. The current contracts with ESPN/ABC and TNT generate $930 million
annually, but the next deals, which are likely to include competitive bidding from
Rupert Murdoch’s recently formed Fox Sports 1, may reach $2 billion per year. See
Badenhausen, supra note 75 (discussing current television rights fees for NBA); see R
also Richard Sandomir, James Andrew Miller & Steve Eder, To Protect Its Empire,
ESPN Stays on Offense, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2013/08/27/sports/ncaafootball/to-defend-its-empire-espn-stays-on-
offensive.html (discussing potential challenges ESPN faces from Fox Sports 1).
80. See John Ourand & John Lombardo, NBA Ready to Discuss Rights Deal,
SPORTS BUS. J. (May 13, 2013), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Is-
sues/2013/05/13/Media/NBA-TV-rights.aspx (discussing upcoming negotiations
for NBA media rights).  Under the current system, the NBA teams equally divide
the national television and licensing revenue, as well as the international money,
but do not share local television or gate revenue.  An expansion team pays a one-
time fee to the owners but then expands the pie for revenue sharing over the long
term. See McCann, Single Entity Defense, supra note 4, at 51 (noting that, overall, R
teams only share approximately 25 percent of all revenue).  The former ABA
teams receive slightly less than an equal share of the television revenue based on
the agreement they signed when they joined the league. See Badenhausen, supra
note 75. R
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C. Contraction: Labor Law
The inclusion of a contraction-specific provision in the CBA
reduces the likelihood of labor-related litigation.  Under the collec-
tive bargaining requirements of the NLRA, the parties must “meet
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to” the
mandatory subjects of collective bargaining.  Such “mandatory sub-
jects” refer to “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment.”81  The inherent ambiguity of the phrase “other terms
and conditions of employment” has given rise to extensive litigation
between owners and players across the major sports leagues.82  Fol-
lowing the MLB’s decision to contract two teams, the Major League
Baseball Players Association (“MLBPA”) filed a grievance alleging
that the owners were guilty of unfair labor practices for failure to
secure the union’s approval in advance.83  The owners countered
that they were only obligated to bargain regarding the fallout from
contraction, such as the need to disperse the displaced players.84
With the grievance pending, the parties reached a new CBA that
delayed contraction until at least after the 2006 season and in-
cluded an agreement to drop the grievance.85  Yet in the MLB’s
case, the CBA (known in baseball as the “Basic Agreement”) did not
include a provision for contraction.  Instead, the 2000 MLB Consti-
tution authorized contraction if three-fourths of the clubs voted in
favor.86  Here, the NBA CBA’s explicit inclusion of “contraction”
seemingly renders the issue moot, since the players have conceded
that the owners can unilaterally contract a team as long as they pro-
vide the NBPA with advance written notice.  The players, for their
part, are required to negotiate and agree upon the procedures for
carrying out the contraction.  In the event that the parties fail to
agree, the CBA provides for a “System Arbitrator” to resolve any
81. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2013).
82. See J. Benjamin Staherski, Comment, Contraction in Major League Baseball:
Do Owners Have a Duty to Bargain in Good Faith with the Union Before Shutting Down or
Relocating a Team?, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 881 (2004) (holding that under 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(d) and applicable case law, owner does not have to bargain with Major
League Baseball Players’ Association prior to contracting team).
83. See John T. Wolohan, Major League Baseball Contraction and Antitrust Law,
10 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 5, 5-6 (2003) (describing circumstances surrounding
MLB Commissioner Bud Selig’s announcement that two teams might be con-
tracted from league).
84. See Rosner, History and Business, supra note 58, at 266. R
85. See Wolohan, supra note 83, at 6 n.5. R
86. See Major League Baseball v. Butterworth, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1319
(N.D. Fla. 2001).
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disputes, and for an Appeals Panel to review the System Arbitrator’s
findings of fact and conclusions of law.87
The tersely worded provision, however, should put Silver on
notice.  For starters, under the definitional section of the CBA, the
term “negotiate” refers “to a player or his representatives on the
one hand, and a Team or its representatives on the other hand”
and covers the “engage[ment] in any written or oral communica-
tion relating to the possible employment, or terms of employment,
of such player by such Team as a basketball player, regardless of
who initiates such communication.”88  Contraction, of course, does
not involve an individual player and will only serve to exacerbate
tensions within the union and among the players’ representatives.
More importantly, the ambiguity of contraction’s status as a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining enhances the likelihood
that the players would respond to any threat of contraction by in-
voking the union’s right to terminate the CBA after the sixth season
and then seek to reach a new agreement that does not include such
a provision.89  By pursuing such a path, the players would aim to
deny the NBA the unilateral right to contract a franchise, knowing
that the owners would only be able to retain that right by proving to
the courts that contraction is not a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining.
Although no court has been asked to rule on whether contrac-
tion of a professional sports team constitutes such a subject, the
owners would likely prevail.  In First National Maintenance Corp. v.
NLRB,90 the Supreme Court addressed whether an employer had
the duty to bargain over the partial closure of its business.  Ruling
in favor of the employer, the Court divided partial closures into
three categories based on the degree to which the management de-
cision impacted the relationship between employer and em-
ployee.91  As in First National, the partial closure in question here
falls into the third category involving “a direct impact on employ-
ment,” but focused only on the economic profitability of the can-
celled contract.92  First National provided its corporate customers
87. See CBA 2011 (Art. XXXII, “System Arbitration”).
88. CBA 2011.
89. See id. (Art. XXXIX, Sec. 1).  The current CBA, effective December 8,
2011, continues through June 30, 2021.  Each side retains the right, however, to
terminate the agreement on June 30, 2017. See id. (Art. XXXIX, Sec. 2) (exercis-
ing option to terminate requires serving other side with written notification before
December 15, 2016).
90. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
91. See id. at 676-77.
92. Id. at 677.
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with basic housekeeping services in exchange for covering fixed la-
bor costs and a set fee.  When Greenpark Care Center cut its set fee
in half, First National discontinued its service.  Like First National’s
decision, the NBA’s decision would be driven in part by labor costs
and lead to the loss of jobs for union members, but it would also
represent a broader business decision grounded in concerns over
the league’s profitability, or lack thereof.93  Again, labor costs
would clearly be a factor, but it is not as if the league would subcon-
tract the lost union work to nonunionized players or necessarily at-
tempt to relocate the franchise.94  In addition to the reduced labor
costs, the NBA would no longer need to invest in the contracted
franchise via revenue sharing.  Although the individual teams pay
player salaries and generally shoulder capital costs, such as stadium
repair, the league contributes to both by subsidizing financially un-
derperforming franchises.95  The NBPA, moreover, would have no
ability to influence economic factors outside of salaries, such as gate
receipts, advertising, etc.  In short, the league would be making “an
economically motivated decision to shut down part of a business”
that would outweigh any minimal benefit from permitting the
union to participate in reaching such a decision.96
D. Contraction: Nonstatutory Labor Exemption
In the event that the NBPA opted-out of the current CBA and
failed to reach a new agreement, the question would shift to
whether the nonstatutory labor exemption continued to protect
contraction from antitrust attack.  In Bridgeman v. National Basketball
Association,97 current and former professional basketball players
sued the league in the United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey, arguing that assorted player restraints violated anti-
trust laws.  The challenged restraints – the college player draft, sal-
ary cap, and right of first refusal –had been included in the prior
93. See id. (“This decision, involving a change in the scope and direction of
the enterprise, is akin to the decision whether to be in business at all, ‘not in
[itself] primarily about conditions of employment, though the effect of the deci-
sion may be necessarily to terminate employment.’”) (citing Fibreboard Paper
Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964)).
94. See Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964)
(ruling that company’s decision to subcontract its work constituted mandatory sub-
ject of collective bargaining).
95. For an in-depth overview of the economics behind sports stadiums, see
KEVIN J. DELANEY & RICK EDELSTEIN, PUBLIC DOLLARS, PRIVATE STADIUMS: THE BAT-
TLE OVER BUILDING SPORTS STADIUMS (2003).
96. First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 680, 686 (1981).
97. 675 F. Supp. 960 (D.N.J. 1987) (discussing Mackey v. Nat’l Football
League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976)).
19
Yoffie: There's a New Sheriff in Town: Commissioner-Elect Adam Silver & t
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
34639-vls_21-1 Sheet No. 47 Side B      03/14/2014   13:49:04
34639-vls_21-1 Sheet No. 47 Side B      03/14/2014   13:49:04
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\21-1\VLS104.txt unknown Seq: 20 11-MAR-14 10:46
78 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21: p. 59
CBA.98  But the CBA expired following the 1986-87 season, and at
the time of the suit, the NBPA and NBA were unable to reach a new
agreement.99  The NBA responded by filing an unfair labor practice
with the National Labor Relations Board demanding that the NBPA
return to the negotiating table.  The league, meanwhile, continued
to abide by the old CBA and countered in federal court that the
nonstatutory labor exemption was still applicable after the agree-
ment expired as long as the league continued to apply the chal-
lenged restraints without alteration.  Seeking to find common
ground between the two sides, the court “[found] no merit in the
players’ contention that restrictions included in a CBA should lose
their antitrust immunity the moment the agreement expires.”100
Yet the court also rejected the NBA’s argument that the antitrust
exemption applied indefinitely following the expiration of an
agreement as long as it “maintain[ed] the status quo by not impos-
ing any new restraints.”101  In attempting to craft a compromise for
when the exemption expires after the termination of a CBA, the
court instituted a two-part test: (1) the employer continues to im-
pose the player restraint without modification; and (2) the em-
ployer “reasonably believes” that the restraint, or a close variation of
it, will be included in the next CBA.102  Based on the second factor,
98. See id. at 962. (“Under the right of first refusal, an NBA team has the right
to retain a veteran free agent’s services indefinitely by matching offers received by
that player from other NBA teams.”).  The draft and right of first refusal were
included in the 1980 CBA that expired on June 1, 1982.  In 1983, the NBA tried to
introduce the salary cap, and the players filed suit.  The NBPA and NBA resolved
the matter by entering into a Memorandum of Understanding that modified the
expired 1980 CBA.  The modified CBA included the college draft, right of first
refusal, and the salary cap, and ran through the 1986-87 season. See Bridgeman v.
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 675 F. Supp. 960, 962 (D.N.J. 1987).
99. Following the expiration of the CBA, the NBA and NBPA entered into a
Moratorium Agreement for the purpose of facilitating negotiations.  The players
commenced this action on the day that the Moratorium Agreement expired. See
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069, 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
100. Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 965.  The court grounded its ruling in the
collective bargaining concept of “impasse.”  Following the expiration of a CBA, an
employer cannot unilaterally alter a subject of mandatory bargaining before nego-
tiations reach an “impasse.” See Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475 (1967)
(summarizing factors for assessing existence of impasse).
101. Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 966 (“This facile manner of evading the anti-
trust laws would discourage unions from entering collective bargaining agree-
ments, since doing so might forever bar them from challenging those restraints in
court.”).
102. Id. at 967 (referring to second part of test, Bridgeman court explained,
“[w]hen the employer no longer has such a reasonable belief, it is then unilaterally
imposing the restriction on its employees, and the restraint can no longer be
deemed the product of arms-length negotiation between the union and the em-
ployer”). But see Powell v. Nat’l Football League, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989)
(extending nonstatutory labor exemption from antitrust laws beyond impasse).
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the NBPA could make a strong argument that contraction would
lose its exemption.  Unlike the restraints challenged in Bridgeman,
contraction has not been a regular provision included since the ini-
tial CBAs between the league and union.  As noted above, contrac-
tion appeared in the CBA for the first time in 2011.  Therefore, the
owners would not be able to conclude reasonably that contraction
would be included in any subsequent CBAs.
Other courts, however, have not been as favorable to players’
unions.103  In National Basketball Association v. Williams,104 the same
issues arose following the expiration of the 1988 CBA after the
1993-94 season.  The court found that the nonstatutory labor ex-
emption was valid as long as a collective bargaining relationship ex-
isted between the two sides and suggested decertification of the
union as an option for terminating its application.105  In Brown v.
Pro Football, Inc.,106 the United States Supreme Court upheld the
application of the nonstatutory labor exemption to the NFL’s uni-
lateral imposition of uniform salaries for development squad play-
ers following collective bargaining to the point of impasse.
Although refusing to delineate an exact demarcation point, the
Court approvingly cited to the lower court’s suggestion that the ex-
emption would only cease to apply following the collapse of the
collective-bargaining relationship, as determined via union decer-
tification.107  In Brown, moreover, the NFL was trying to impose a
novel restriction that had never been subject to prior collective bar-
gaining.  Contraction, on the other hand, was part of the 2011 col-
lective bargaining process.  Therefore, the union would likely need
to decertify the union in order to remove contraction from the pro-
tective realm of the exemption and challenge the maneuver in fed-
eral court on antitrust grounds.
E. Single-Entity Status Revisited
Challenging contraction on anti-trust grounds also raises the
perennial question of the league’s status as a single-entity under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.108  Single entities are not subject to
103. See, e.g., Powell, 930 F.2d 1293 (applying nonstatutory labor exemption
from antitrust laws beyond impasse, as long as parties maintained labor
relationship).
104. 857 F. Supp. 1069, aff’d, in part, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995).
105. See id. at 1078.
106. 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
107. See id. at 235 (citing Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1057 (D.C.
Cir. 1995)).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2013).
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Section 1 scrutiny because as unitary actors they cannot come to-
gether in concerted action to restrain trade.109  Although, as dis-
cussed below, contraction would likely survive antitrust scrutiny, the
mechanics for carrying it out are worth considering.  The applica-
ble CBA provision provides few specifics.  Yet as the MLB prepared
to do, the NBA would probably purchase the targeted team before
formally contracting it.  The owner losing his team would not pass
on the opportunity to reap hundreds of millions of dollars from the
NBA, and the league would not want to risk a sale to another owner
opposed to contraction.  The league would also assume the out-
standing player agreements for the purposes of arranging a disper-
sal draft and covering contractual liabilities.  Therefore, the
contracted team would become a subsidiary of the league, seem-
ingly triggering the application of Copperweld Corp. v. Independent
Tube Corp.,110 in which the Court held that a parent and its wholly
owned subsidiary constitute a single enterprise immune from Sec-
tion 1.111
Yet in the landmark case American Needle, Inc. v. National Foot-
ball League,112 the Supreme Court rejected the NFL’s argument for
single entity status within the context of intellectual property licens-
ing.  The thirty-two teams had come together to form National
Football League Properties (“NFLP”), which collectively licensed
the teams’ intellectual property.113  In 2000, NFLP switched from
granting nonexclusive licenses to multiple vendors, to granting
Reebok International Ltd. an exclusive decade-long license.114
American Needle, a prior vendor excluded by the new Reebok li-
cense, brought suit in federal court under the Sherman Act.115  The
unanimous opinion by Justice Stevens focused on the role of the
teams as independent actors, each with a “separate corporate con-
109. See Gabriel Feldman, The Puzzling Persistence of the Single-Entity Argument for
Sports Leagues: American Needle and the Supreme Court’s Opportunity to Reject a Flawed
Defense, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 835, 835 (2009) (arguing against application of single
entity status to sports league on theoretical and practical grounds).  Legal single
entities, however, may still violate § 1 when competitors owned the single entity in
order to facilitate concerted activity. See United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350
(1967).
110. 476 U.S. 752 (1984).
111. For a discussion of Copperweld and its application within the sports con-
text, see McCann, Single Entity Defense, supra note 4, at 55; Meir Feder, Is There Life R
After Death for Sports League Immunity? American Needle and Beyond, 18 VILL. SPORTS
& ENT. L.J. 407, 409 (2011).
112. 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010).
113. See id. at 2207.  The NBA has a similar entity in NBA Properties, Inc.
114. See id.
115. See id.
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sciousness.”116  Stevens conceded that the teams share common in-
terests through their mutual desire to promote the league, but
noted that “they are still separate, profit-maximizing entities, and
their interests in licensing team trademarks are not necessarily
aligned.”117
Therefore, the league and its member teams do not constitute
a single entity.  But a contracted team purchased by the league, al-
beit on a vote by the other teams’ owners, operates with the same
“unity of purpose” as the parent league itself.118  Although the
league has purchased teams in the past, such as the then-New Orle-
ans Hornets, the transitional ownership period was for the distinct
purpose of identifying a new owner capable of operating the
franchise.119  Under contraction, an independent competitor
would be ultimately subsumed by the joint venture in which it was
formerly a member.120  Therefore, in electing to carry out contrac-
tion, the league would not be operating as a single entity.  Yet once
it purchases the team, the NBA would be able to make a strong
argument that it was acting as a single entity when it terminates the
former independent unit and now wholly owned subsidiary.
F. Contraction: Antitrust
As Justice Stevens pointed out in American Needle, failing to
qualify as a single entity does not trap sports leagues.121  The lack of
single entity status just means that NBA restraints are subject to Sec-
tion 1 scrutiny.122  Even though contraction would “restrict compe-
tition and decrease output,” Supreme Court precedent dictates that
116. Id. at 2212 (noting competition on playing field and in arena of
business).
117. Id. at 2213 (citations omitted).
118. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771-72.
119. See Press Release, Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, NBA to Purchase New Orleans
Hornets (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.nba.com/2010/news/12/06/hornets/index.
html.
120. Such action would seemingly fit within the NBA’s more recent business
strategy that focuses on the aggressive development and operation of wholly
owned subsidiaries–such as NBA Properties, the Developmental League (D-
League), Women’s NBA (WNBA), and NBA China.  See generally McCann, Single
Entity Defense, supra note 4, at 40 (exploring connection between NBA and its re- R
lated corporate entities within context of single entity status).
121. American Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2216.
122. Contraction fits neatly under Justice Stevens’ description of the relevant
inquiry: “[W]hether there is a contract, combination . . . or conspiracy amongst
separate economic actors pursuing separate economic interests, such that the
agreement deprives the marketplace of independent centers of decisionmaking,
and therefore of diversity of entrepreneurial interests and thus of actual or poten-
tial competition.” Id. at 2212 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
23
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it would not be “illegal per se” because, like other sports leagues,
the NBA relies on horizontal restraints in order to produce its
product.123
The question for contraction is whether it would be subject to
traditional “rule of reason” scrutiny or to “quick look” rule of rea-
son.  The former revolves around one question: whether the chal-
lenged restraint is more pro-competitive than it is
anticompetitive.124  The latter combines rule of reason and per se
analyses.125  In American Needle, Justice Stevens suggested that re-
straints such as the establishment of a licensing subsidiary would
likely pass an analysis in which rule of reason scrutiny is applied by
the reviewing court “in the twinkling of an eye.”126  Yet in the sports
league context, courts and commentators have generally favored
the intermediate “quick look” level of analysis.127
Contraction is not as easy to classify as the licensing of intellec-
tual property in that it is both anti-competitive and pro-competitive.
By eliminating one of the thirty teams (3.3 percent of the league),
the NBA would reduce competition for the remaining twenty-nine
teams.  Absent accompanying structural changes, there would be
one less team to compete for that final playoff spot.  Regardless of
changes to the playoff format, however, there would be one less
team capable of winning the championship.  On the other hand,
contraction is also pro-competitive by redistributing limited talent
to a reduced number of franchises, thereby enhancing the competi-
tive balance between the remaining teams.128  Yet as alluded to
above, the mechanism for carrying out contraction would merit se-
rious review.  Would the league, via the Commissioner’s office, sin-
gle-handedly decide that a team should be contracted or would the
owners be required to approve such a decision?  And if the latter,
123. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla.,
468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984).
124. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
125. In a pre-American Needle law review article, Michael McCann and Joseph
Rosen described the “quick look” rule of reason as a “hybrid form of scrutiny” that
“blends rule of reason and per se analyses.”  Michael A. McCann & Joseph S. Ro-
sen, Legality of Age Restrictions in the NBA and the NFL, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 731,
735-36 (2006).
126. American Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2217 (citing Bd. Of Regents, 468 U.S. at 109
n.39).
127. See McCann & Rosen, Legality of Age Restrictions, supra note 125 (citing R
Daniel E. Lazaroff, Sports Equipment Standardization: An Antitrust Analysis, 34 GA. L.
REV. 137, 147-48 (1999)).
128. See Windhorst, supra note 52 (quoting LeBron James as describing net- R
competitive benefit of contracting teams).
24
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by how many votes?129  In purchasing the then-New Orleans Hor-
nets and arranging for a new owner, the NBA set a dangerous pre-
cedent that may prevent it from contracting a team in the future.
Instead of contraction, fans, local business owners, and politicians
will inevitably expect the league to purchase the team in question
and play dealmaker in identifying a new ownership group.
Given the competing pro- and anti-competitive aspects of con-
traction, a district court would likely deny a motion to dismiss by
the NBA.  At a minimum, the court would need to make factual
findings on the record before rendering judgment, thereby putting
the league at risk of paying treble damages.
G. Contraction: State-Level Litigation
The “parade of horribles” has already transitioned from a CBA
containing a provision for contraction to union decertification and
antitrust litigation.  Contraction, however, would also generate op-
position outside of the players’ union.  Major League Baseball’s flir-
tation with contraction, for example, spurred litigation at the local
level.  In Metropolitan Sports Facilities Commission v. Minnesota Twins
Partnership,130 the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld a temporary
injunction obligating the Minnesota Twins to play its 2002 home
games at the Hubert H. Humphrey Metrodome Stadium, thereby
preventing the contraction of the team in advance of the 2002 sea-
son.  The Plaintiff, a state governmental entity created to construct
and operate the Metrodome, brought suit against the Twins follow-
ing reports that MLB intended to contract the franchise.  Under
the use agreement between the two parties, the team did not pay
any rent for its regular season home games, but the Commission
took a percentage of concessions and advertising, as well as rent
from any postseason games.131  The Commission initiated a declara-
tory judgment action seeking specific performance of the use agree-
ment and an injunction preventing the league from interfering in
the contractual relations between the two parties.132  In upholding
the lower court’s award of a temporary injunction, the appeals
court did not rule on the merits.  But it affirmed on the grounds
that in addition to the loss of non-fixed revenue, the Commission
would not have been able to fulfill the statutory purpose for the
129. The public’s lack of access to the league’s By-Laws and Constitution
make it impossible to determine if such decisions have already been made.
130. 638 N.W.2d 214 (2002).
131. See id. at 219.
132. See id. at 219-20.
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stadium, which was built and operated for the enjoyment of sports
fans.133  The court rejected the MLB/Twins argument that calcula-
ble money damages precluded a temporary injunction and that the
court was barred from considering harm to the public, which was
not a party to the suit.134  The Twins had already exercised its 2002
option under the use agreement, published a schedule, sold season
tickets, and had yet to approve contraction via the owner’s sale of
the team to the league.135  The court further explained that the
stadium was publicly financed, generally untaxed, and offered in-
tangible benefits to the city.136
The failure to follow through with contraction precluded an
ultimate resolution to the matter, but the suit is instructive for the
NBA in that the inclusion of a contraction clause in the CBA has,
unsurprisingly, no bearing on contractual agreements between lo-
cal teams and home cities.137  For example, the Minnesota
Timberwolves–a frequent focus of any contraction discussions–play
in the publicly owned Target Center.138  The stadium opened in
1990 with the assistance of $23 million in public subsidies and was
eventually sold in full to the Minneapolis Community Development
Authority (“MCDA”) for $54.6 million.139  At the time of the sale,
133. See id. at 223 (citing Minn. Stat. Ann. § 473.581 and City of New York v.
N.Y. Jets Football Club, Inc., 394 N.Y.S. 2d 799, 803 (Sup. Ct. 1977)).
134. See id. at 223-24.
135. See id. at 226.
136. See id. at 224-25.  In Butterworth, the league was more successful in its suit
for injunctive relief. See 181 F. Supp. 2d 1316 (N.D. Fla. 2001).  Following base-
ball’s vote to contract, the Florida Attorney General issued Civil Investigative De-
mands to MLB, the Commissioner, and the two MLB teams in the state (Marlins
and Devil Rays) under his authority to investigate federal and state antitrust viola-
tions. See id. at 1318.  The court accepted the league’s argument that the “business
of baseball,” including contraction, was exempt from federal and state antitrust
laws. See id. at 1318.
137. Although dealing with franchise relocation, as opposed to contraction,
Elizabeth Odian proposes an innovative response: community ownership, a` la the
Green Bay Packers. See Odian, Preventing Sonicsgate, supra note 61.  Yet community R
ownership as an alternative to contraction presents its own host of problems, in-
cluding the high costs associated with taking a team public and the limited reve-
nue sharing in the NBA, as compared to the NFL, that would be necessary to cover
the funding of operations and player salaries. See id. at 83 (footnotes omitted).
138. See Timberwolves: Kevin Love Brushes Off LeBron James’ Contraction Comments,
TWINCITIES.COM (Dec. 27, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.twincities.com/sports/ci_
16951503.
139. See James Quirk, Stadiums and Major League Sports, in SPORTS, JOBS &
TAXES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS 225, 238-39 (Roger
G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist eds., 1997) (noting that Minneapolis issued $70.8 mil-
lion in general obligation bonds and MCDA issued $12.7 million in revenue bonds
to cover purchase price, pay off previous bonds used to buy land and ensure suffi-
cient financing and reserve obligations).
26
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the new team owner signed a thirty-year rental agreement.140  Un-
like the Twins, the Timberwolves pay rent to the governmental en-
tity that owns the arena for the use of the stadium, thereby making
damages somewhat easier to calculate.141  Yet the agreement is com-
plicated by the involvement of an outside vendor that is responsible
for covering all operation and maintenance expenses in exchange
for the receipt of operating revenues.142  In short, the City, which
relies on the Timberwolves to cover interest and amortization pay-
ments and is working with the team on a $100 million renovation of
the arena, would pose a formidable legal obstacle to any league
plans for contraction.143
IV. LABOR RELATIONS & CONTRACTION IN THE PROKHOROV ERA
In the fall of 2009, Russian billionaire Mikhail D. Prokhorov
invested $200 million for an eighty percent stake in the then-New
Jersey Nets and a forty-five percent stake in a planned Brooklyn
arena.144  As expected, the team has since moved to the Barclays
140. See id. (describing rental agreement as including provision permitting
Glen Taylor, franchise owner, to move team if he loses money in consecutive years
but requiring him to give MDCA opportunity to purchase team for same price he
paid, plus three percent per year).
141. See id. at 238 (describing complex funding formula between franchise
owner and city of Minneapolis).
142. See id. (stating that Ogden Entertainment initially managed day-to-day
operations of arena but management has since changed hands multiple times).
143. See id. at 239 (noting that average revenues under financing plan be-
tween City and Timberwolves is just equal to amount that would cover interest and
amortization payments and that burden of economic uncertainty falls primarily on
City).  Sports fans themselves, especially season ticket holders, are likely to bring
an antitrust suit against the league as direct purchasers suffering a concrete harm.
See, e.g., McCoy v. Major League Baseball, 911 F. Supp. 454, 458 (W.D. Wash. 1995)
(holding that fans lacked standing to challenge baseball’s antitrust exemption due
to absence of evidence indicating owners intended to harm them, indirect nature
of injury, and origin of their damages).  The Clayton Act allows private parties to
bring such actions for damages and injunctive relief. See 15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq. See,
e.g., Laumann v. NHL, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (permitting subscribers
to out-of-market television packages for professional baseball and hockey games to
proceed with their suit and sue MLB and NHL, amongst others, under antitrust).
Yet in weighing whether localized fans have standing, a court would need to “evalu-
ate [their] harm, the alleged wrongdoing by the defendants, and the relationship
between them.”  Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 535 (1983).  The plaintiff fans would need to contend
with Supreme Court precedent recognizing that “Congress did not intend antitrust
laws to provide a remedy in damages for all injuries that might conceivably be
traced to an antitrust violation.” Id. at 534 (internal quotations omitted).  Their
harm, nonetheless, would appear to be far more direct and traceable to the league
than that of television subscribers dealing with distributors.
144. The former owner of the perennial Euroleague contender CSKA Mos-
cow, Prokhorov has recently received permission to move the team’s ownership
vehicle to Russia to comply with Russian election laws restricting the international
27
Yoffie: There's a New Sheriff in Town: Commissioner-Elect Adam Silver & t
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
34639-vls_21-1 Sheet No. 51 Side B      03/14/2014   13:49:04
34639-vls_21-1 Sheet No. 51 Side B      03/14/2014   13:49:04
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\21-1\VLS104.txt unknown Seq: 28 11-MAR-14 10:46
86 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21: p. 59
Center at the intersection of Atlantic and Flatbush Avenues and has
changed its name to the Brooklyn Nets.  The first international
owner in the NBA, Prokhorov has wasted little time in putting his
vast wealth to work.145  Next season, the Net’s payroll of $101 mil-
lion will be the highest in the league.146  After signing aging Celtics
superstars Kevin Garnett and Paul Pierce, the Nets will pay a league-
record $82 million luxury tax bill.147  Following the acquisition,
Prokhorov bluntly stated: “Frankly speaking, I’ll do whatever I can
do in order to reach [a] championship here in Brooklyn. . . . For
me, it was the goal when I bought the N.B.A. team.”148  With a for-
tune estimated at $13 billion, Prokhorov is the league’s second rich-
est owner and fourteenth billionaire owner in the NBA.149  Yet
unlike some of his colleagues, Prokhorov has spent with seemingly
reckless abandon, and in the process created a major threat to the
stability of the league.150
From a labor and employment perspective, Prokhorov has dis-
regarded the carefully calibrated compromises reached in the most
holdings of Russian political candidates. See Paul Sonne, The Nets Are About to
‘Move’ to Russia, WSJ.COM (June 14, 2013, 1:56 PM), http://online.wsj.com/arti-
cle/SB10001424127887323734304578543601212910428.html.  He ran for presi-
dent in 2012 and won seven percent of the vote. See Andrew E. Kramer, Political
Endurance Test for Russian Billionaire, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2013), at A4, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/29/world/europe/political-endurance-test-
for-russian-billionaire.html.
145. See Charles V. Bagli, Richest Russian’s Newest Toy: An N.B.A. Team, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 24, 2009), at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/24/
sports/basketball/24nets.html.
146. See Howard Beck, For NBA’s Version of Steinbrenner, $183 Million Is No Ob-
ject, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2013), at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/
07/19/sports/basketball/for-nets-prokhorov-nbas-version-of-steinbrenner-183-mil-
lion-is-no-object.html (“The Nets’ payroll next season will surge to a league-high
$101 million, triggering a league-record luxury tax bill of about $82 million.”).
147. See id. (describing Nets as title contenders based on team’s starting
lineup that includes current or former NBA All-Star at all five positions, each earn-
ing at least $11 million next season).  “The estimated $82 million bill will be more
than triple what the Nets paid in luxury taxes for the last 11 seasons combined.  It
is more than all teams combined paid last season.” Id.
148. Id.
149. See id. (noting that Portland Trail Blazers’ Paul Allen is wealthiest owner
with estimated net worth of $15 billion).
150. There may be a sound business argument for expending such sums on
the roster; the value of the team increased by nearly fifty percent when it moved
from New Jersey to Brooklyn. See Beck, supra note 146.  The recent high-profile R
trades have also caused a surge in season-ticket sales. See id.  Yet the chief executive
of the team and arena conceded that the increase in ticket and paraphernalia sales
is unlikely to match the luxury tax bill. See id; see also Windhorst, supra note 43 (“‘I R
haven’t looked at the Nets’ balance sheet, but my guess is they’re not necessarily
going to be profitable,’ said Stern, referring to owner Mikhail Prokhorov’s deci-
sion to pay an estimated $80 million in luxury taxes alone this upcoming season.”).
28
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recent CBA aimed at restoring financial parity to the NBA.151  For
the most part, the more restrictive CBA has been successful in
reigning in the spending of teams like the Dallas Mavericks, which
passed on re-signing Tyson Chandler to a $56 million contract fol-
lowing the team’s 2011 Championship.152  Mark Cuban, the outspo-
ken Mavericks owner, cited the new CBA as justification for his
decision.153  Under the new tax system, the teams will no longer pay
a dollar-for-dollar luxury tax penalty.154  Instead, the tax starts at
$1.50 per dollar over the set threshold and then increases for every
$5 million spent.155  The Nets are not the first team to exceed the
$100 million payroll mark, but they are the first team to be penal-
ized so severely under the new agreement.  The $82 million tax bill
is expected to surpass the complete payrolls of at least twenty-five
teams next season.156  Such disparity in pay is likely to spur labor
unrest as the players see wider gaps between their salaries and the
owners push for greater restrictions on compensation.157  There
may be little the Board of Governors can do if one of the owners is
willing to operate his team in a financially irrational manner with-
151. See Krueger-Wyman, Best Interests, supra note 48, at 186 (describing new R
CBA as benefitting small-market teams like Milwaukee Bucks and Utah Jazz
through achieving greater “[c]ompetitive [b]alance” by “virtually strip[ping] per-
ennial over-spenders of the ability to violate the salary cap (at least without paying
dearly for it)”) (emphasis added).
152. See Beckley Mason, In a Changed N.B.A., Two Differing Steps in Texas, N.Y.
TIMES, July 21, 2013, at SP5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/
sports/basketball/minimizing-need-for-a-second-star-can-be-perilous.html.  In or-
der to reduce its tax bill, the defending champion Miami Heat waived Mike Miller,
who played an integral role in 2013 NBA Finals against the San Antonio Spurs. See
Brian Windhorst, Heat Waive Veteran Mike Miller, ESPN.COM (July 17, 2013), http://
espn.go.com/nba/truehoop/miamiheat/story/_/id/9482980/miami-heat-waive-
mike-miller-amnesty-clause (noting that maneuver will save team approximately
$17 million in luxury taxes for upcoming season, halving team’s anticipated tax
bill, which will still exceed luxury tax bill paid during 2012-2013 season).
153. See Mason, supra note 152 (quoting Dallas Mavericks’ owner Mark Cuban, R
“Because of the new set of rules . . . there’s going to be a different market for
pricing players.  And when there’s a different market for pricing players, you’ve
got to introduce a different methodology for building a team.”).
154. See Beck, supra note 146 (noting that big-spending NBA teams that previ- R
ously paid dollar-for-dollar penalty will not pay more punitive penalty at higher
rate).
155. See id.; see also Larry Coons, NBA SALARY CAP FAQ, http://www.cbafaq.
com/salarycap.htm#Q21 (last visited Aug. 4, 2013) (noting that in subsequent sea-
sons, luxury tax will also include “repeater rate” based on whether the team was
subject to penalty in prior seasons).
156. See Beck, supra note 146 (highlighting massive over-spending of Nets, in- R
cluding steep penalty, as compared to other teams within NBA).
157. The owners may want to consider an even more punitive tax system or a
hard cap that fiscally reckless owners could not circumvent.  Yet the players would
understandably oppose both, especially the latter, given the likelihood of depress-
ing salaries.
29
Yoffie: There's a New Sheriff in Town: Commissioner-Elect Adam Silver & t
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
34639-vls_21-1 Sheet No. 52 Side B      03/14/2014   13:49:04
34639-vls_21-1 Sheet No. 52 Side B      03/14/2014   13:49:04
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\21-1\VLS104.txt unknown Seq: 30 11-MAR-14 10:46
88 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21: p. 59
out regard to profit.  But futility is unlikely to stop all parties in-
volved from trying.  Given that under the NLRA, the parties must
“meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to”
the mandatory subjects of collective bargaining, including “wages,”
any attempts to reign in profligate owners will require additional
negotiating and enhance the prospect that either side will opt-out
of the CBA following the 2016-2017 season.158  The most recent
work stoppage, which included an offensive lockout, union decer-
tification, and highly contentious litigation, demonstrates the mag-
nitude of the Prokhorov-driven challenges ahead for Silver.159
The Nets’ spending spree, moreover, may not translate into im-
mediate talks of contraction, but it will further expose the already
discernible gap between the “haves” and “have-nots.”160  Under the
current CBA, up to fifty percent of the tax money can be distrib-
uted to those teams that fall below the penalty.161  Although none
of the money has to be redistributed to the non-taxpayers,162 the
remaining money – at least fifty percent – must be used for “league
purposes.”  In 2011-12, the NBA devoted all of the tax revenue to its
revenue sharing program.163  The revenue sharing system is sepa-
rate from the luxury tax and aims to correct the disparities stem-
ming from the impact big-market teams have on increasing the
salary cap, and thereby the expenses of smaller-market teams.164
158. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2013).  The current CBA runs through the 2020-21
season, but either party may opt out following the 2016-17 season, as long as notice
is given by December 15, 2016. See Coons, supra note 155, at 9. R
159. For an overview of the underlying legal issues driving the 2011 work stop-
page, see Feldman, Shifting Dynamics, supra note 45. R
160. Contraction, even the mere prospect of it, would greatly exacerbate la-
bor relations, as it would mean a reduction in employment opportunities for play-
ers.  Under the 2011 CBA, each team committed to maintaining twelve or thirteen
players on its Active List. See CBA 2011, supra note 72, at Art. XXIX, Sec. 1 ( R
“Active Roster Size”).  During the regular season, each team is required to employ
at least fourteen players in the aggregate. See id., at Art. XXIX, Sec. 3(a) (“Mini-
mum League-Wide Roster”).
161. See Coons, supra note 155, at 22. R
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 24 (noting that salary cap is calculated in part based on league’s
basketball-related income (“BRI”), which is partly driven by revenue generated by
larger market teams, thereby creating arms race in which wealthier teams can drive
up costs for poorer teams by bringing in more revenue and increasing costs for
players); see also Andrew Brandt, The Big Deal over BRI: How Basketball Related Income
is Affecting the Latest Round of NBA Labor Negotiations, ESPN.COM (Nov. 5, 2011, 6:19
PM), http://espn.go.com/nba/story/_/id/7194222/basketball-related-income-af-
fects-nba-lockout-talks (providing comprehensive discussion of BRI); see also
Coons, supra note 155, at 24 (“The league’s revenue sharing plan works in parallel R
with the CBA (including luxury tax) as a one-two punch to address franchise eco-
nomic disparity.  It is designed to help redistribute money from high-revenue
30
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Under the revenue sharing program, teams contribute equal shares
of their revenues, and the total amount is then divided equally
amongst the franchises.  As a result, the teams with lower revenues
contribute less and receive more in absolute dollars.165  Yet, under
the revenue sharing system, teams must meet certain revenue re-
quirements based on their home city’s market potential and there-
fore face the prospect of being penalized under the system.166  In
2012-13, the league devoted half of the tax money to the revenue
sharing program and half to the non-taxpaying teams.167
Prokhorov’s profligacy will force Silver to weigh carefully such
percentage allocations, especially since the tax money is guaranteed
at the outset of the season regardless of whether smaller market
teams meet revenue benchmarks.  The revenue sharing system is
also structured in such a way that it is more focused on team profit-
ability than financial parity.  The Nets precedent, however, could
lead the owners to opt-out of the CBA in order to alter the distribu-
tion of payments between teams.168  Although the owners were wise
to grant the league flexibility in rendering allocation determina-
tions, they cannot unilaterally change the system since such a
change would have a direct impact on player salaries and therefore
constitute a “mandatory subject of collective bargaining.”
V. CONCLUSION
Less than eight weeks into the 2013-14 season and three
months till Silver becomes the NBA’s fifth commissioner, the NBPA
lacks an executive director and only recently elected its new union
president.  Yet for the first time since Patrick Ewing’s term ended in
2001, the players’ union has a superstar president in All-Star point
guard Chris Paul.169  Silver may rightfully view the election of Paul
as a positive – providing him with a strong negotiating partner in
teams (generally in big markets) to needier teams (generally in small markets).  By
2013, 14 of all 30 teams are projected to be profitable under this system if they
meet reasonable revenue and expense standards.”).
165. See id.
166. Revenue benchmarks are measured against average league revenues and
vary broadly from sixty-five percent in New Orleans to 160 percent in New York
and Brooklyn. See id.
167. See id.
168. See CBA 2011, supra note 72, Sec. 12(f)(1) (“Each Team whose Team R
Salary exceeds the Tax Level for any Salary Cap Year shall be required to pay a tax
to the NBA.”).
169. See Howard Beck, Clippers’ Paul to Lead Union, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2013,
at B14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/22/sports/basketball/paul-
to-lead-players-union.html.
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advance of the rapidly approaching option for either side to opt-out
of the CBA – or as a negative – invigorating a newly emboldened
union seeking to reestablish itself following infighting and a damag-
ing CBA that heavily favored the owners.170
Regardless of his view, Silver will face a number of financial
and legal obstacles ahead during his first years as commissioner.
No issue embodies those challenges more so than contraction.
Newly added to the most recent CBA, contraction is an untested
tool in the four major professional sports leagues that offers the
prospect of a financial boon to the owners, but also invites significant
labor and antitrust legal challenges.  Nonetheless, Silver will retain
far more power, as well as minimize legal challenges, by ensuring
that the contraction provision remains in the next CBA.  In the
event that the provision is stripped, he should consider seeking
targeted legislation from Congress in the vein of the Sports Broad-
casting Act that permits the major professional sports leagues to
sign joint broadcasting agreements without violating antitrust
laws.171  By retaining the right to contract without fear of being
held liable for treble damages, Silver would possess a powerful tool
against players fearful of losing their jobs, recalcitrant owners con-
sidering relocation, and financially strapped cities and states refus-
ing to support new arenas.  In short, contraction would go a long
way towards helping him fill those “big shoes.”
170. See id. (noting internal audit that charged former executive director Billy
Hunter with gross mismanagement); see also Krueger-Wyman, supra note 48, at 184- R
91 (describing lopsided CBA that heavily favored owners at expense of players).
171. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1295 (2013).
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